Abstract: Current macroeconomic conditions in the developed economies (the US and Euro area) and in East Asia are assessed. Given the likely recession in the euro area and fiscal policy paralysis in the US, the burden of maintaining world growth and sustaining shrinking of external imbalances falls more heavily than in past episodes on East Asian policymakers, particularly those in China. However, the required policy changes would benefit China in moving its growth model to one that is more domestic-demand-driven, and hence sustainable.
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Introduction
Only a year ago, policymakers around the world were confronted with a series of challenges that, while substantial, seemed relatively well defined. International organizations such as the IMF and the OECD highlighted the challenges of managing a two-speed recovery: emerging markets raced ahead, while the advanced economies plodded along. Global financial imbalances, particularly current account imbalances, were a worry, but there were some signs both growth and rebalancing in the United States and China would prove durable.
The prospects for sustained and global recovery now seem much less definite. Over the past half year, most forecasters have revised downward their estimates for growth in the United States and particularly in Europe, where recession is now more likely than not. Anxiety surrounding the durability of Chinese growth has risen in recent months. Against this backdrop, the resurgence in the US trade deficit combined with the reluctance of the Chinese to accelerate currency appreciation suggests the challenges to sustaining both growth and rebalancing are much more profound than policymakers earlier viewed.
The failure in the US to maintain (let alone increase) short term fiscal and monetary stimulus -despite ample evidence of economic slack and little evidence of inflation or crowding out -and the difficulties Euro area policymakers have encountered in forging a resolution to the debt crisis means that, if a global recovery with rebalancing is to be effected, it is incumbent upon policy makers in other countries to step into the breach.
In my view, those measures include greater fiscal stimulus in the current account surplus countries and greater currency appreciation on the part of the East Asian economies. If one takes the European situation as one where policymakers have a difficulty in doing anything more than 2 muddling through the next few years, East Asia will be pivotal. In this respect, the fate of the world economy rests upon policymakers in China and East Asia to a greater extent than any time in the past.
Internal and External Balance
One of the ways the challenges policymakers currently face can be organized is into two dimensions -internal and external balance. Internal balance refers to getting output up to normal levels of output, namely potential GDP; in the absence of other shocks, that level of output should be consistent with non-accelerating inflation. External balance refers to getting the current account to levels consistent with what is consistent with a given country's level of development and fiscal policies. A rough impression of the amount of slack in the world economy can be gleaned from Figure 1 , which shows the growth rates for the advanced and emerging market economies.
[ Figure 1 ] Figure 1 highlights the dichotomous nature of the world economy; the advanced economies are projected to grow slowly, with correspondingly high levels of economic slack, while much of the emerging market economies are growing sufficiently fast so that they are operating above potential GDP. The key asymmetry is that output gaps in the advanced economies are negative, while those in the emerging economies are largely positive.
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The current account imbalances are shown (as a share of world GDP) in Figure 2 . The global recession, which hit the United States particularly hard, has reduced the US current account deficit. However, the IMF forecasts a resurgence in the US deficit, and a concomitant increase in the China plus emerging Asia.
[ Figure 2 about here] Thus, the challenge is to push output upward toward potential in the advanced economies, while simultaneously reducing current account deficits in the United States. Within the Euro area, current account imbalances also have to be reduced. In contrast, the challenge for policymakers in select emerging market economies is to engineer a glide path toward to potential GDP.
The Advanced Economies
The United States is the key to rebalancing the world economy. However, effective policy making has been hampered by misconceptions regarding the current state of the economy. The fear that the economy is coming close to its speed limit is linked to the fear that the natural rate of unemployment has spiked, driven by the suspicion that with the change in the composition of output, the labor market mismatch has increased. The argument has some content, given the large proportion of long term unemployed -the highest on record. However, 4 most estimates do not ascribe more than a small proportion of the increase in unemployment to a rise in the natural rate. The fear that the United States is very close to a tipping point with respect to government debt, which has constrained fiscal policy, is misguided. The US has long faced a long term fiscal problem largely due to rising entitlement spending and refusal to raise sufficient tax revenues; the recession, and particularly the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, merely magnified the problem. The US still possesses some latitude for fiscal stimulus in the short term, as documented by Ostry et al. (2010) . If there is a medium term problem, the solution is not to retrench now, but to conduct countercyclical fiscal policy, while setting forth a plan for medium term fiscal consolidation.
In terms of the current account, prospects for rebalancing are more difficult to assess, in part because the process depends upon what happens in the rest of the world. The IMF projects a gradual increase of the US current account deficit. Given the current constellation of exchange rates, particularly with respect to China, and the failure of Europe to expand rapidly, it is hard to see why these projections should prove substantially incorrect. A more micro based approach is adopted by Dowling, Estevão, and Tsounta (2010) , who directly address the skills mismatch issue. The estimate the natural rate has risen 1.5 ppts. 2 Bertaut, Kamin and Thomas (2009) use the Fed's partial equilibrium model to forecast a similar trajectory for the US current account deficit.
One thing that would change the outlook is a sustained and prolonged depreciation in the US dollar. While real oil imports have stabilized and even dropped, oil still accounts for a large share of the trade deficit. Hence, the US trade deficit remains very susceptible to a rebound in oil prices.
3 Perhaps more importantly, the troubles in the Euro area have induced a flight to dollar denominated assets that have stymied further dollar depreciation.
The key development over the past year has been the gradual unfolding of the drama in the Euro area. It's clear that even if the leaders of the Euro area come to an agreement on how to resolve the sovereign debt crisis, Europe is in for a long period of fiscal consolidation -partly self-defeating in terms of really addressing the debt problem -which will result in recession in the short term. Depending on the parameters of the final agreement, and actions of the European Central Bank, Europe is likely to face a long period of less-than-robust growth (see Eichengreen, 2011 ).
In fact, this scenario is probably the most optimistic one. In the view of many observers, Euro area policymakers have not faced up to the immediate challenges of the debt crisis, and in minds of some, there is not even a long run solution. The recently announced plans for a stronger set of fiscal rules sounds to outsiders like a warmed up version of the Stability and Growth Pact.
They certainly do not constitute a "fiscal union" in the common sense of the word, where fiscal transfers offset asymmetric shocks. At the same time, there is no acknowledgment -at least publicly --that attaining internal equilibrium by adjustment of nominal wages and prices is likely to be incredibly prolonged and painful, and hence politically untenable. Even with a successful recapitalization of the Euro area banks, this contractionary approach to fiscal policy will assure stagnant growth in the Euro area. This will reduce the scope for rebalancing on the 3 Some demand side management proposals are in Chinn (2005) .
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part of the US and East Asian, and at the same time places greater pressure for action by policymakers in these countries.
China and the East Asian Economies
The problems facing the emerging market economies are substantially different than those facing the advanced economies. Of the BRICs, Brazil, Russia and India are already slowing, while the first and last remain above potential. In contrast, China is likely above potential, but growth is slowing rapidly.
China merits extensive discussion for several obvious reasons. First, its rapid growth and heft in the global macroeconomy makes the world economy's fate dependent in part on China's fate. Second, China has a role in global current account imbalances, both directly and, by affecting the conduct of the other East Asian economies, indirectly. The key point is that if China can effect rebalancing toward domestic sources of demand and sustain growth, the chances of avoiding a global recession are greatly enhanced. In particular, as China supplies less tradable goods to the rest of the world, the scope for expenditure switching in Europe and the US will be increased.
There are a couple of ways to examine this issue of rebalancing of the Chinese current account. The first is the conventional elasticities approach, where the impact of Chinese currency misalignment is assessed in a partial equilibrium approach. The second is a more macroeconomic one, in which one views the current account as the outcome of saving and investment and government budget decisions. The latter approach does not necessarily exclude the former; rather it changes the focus.
What is the evidence in favor of the view that Chinese misalignment of the Renminbi has driven the surge in the Chinese trade surplus? The trade weighted real value of the Renminbi, and the Chinese trade balance are illustrated in Figure 3 .
[ Figure 3 about here]
The fact that the Renminbi appreciates even as the trade balance surges does not invalidate the proposition that exchange rates can have an impact. Exchange rates typically appreciate as countries experience rapid economic growth. 4 Nonetheless, the empirical evidence regarding the strength of exchange rate effects on Chinese trade is not definitive. Studies using
Chinese data predating the Great Recession find some effects of the exchange rate on Chinese exports, but do not typically find correspondingly large and statistically significant effects of the exchange rate on Chinese imports.
More recently, using data spanning the recent recession and sharp drop-off and rebound in Chinese imports and exports, Ahmed (2009) finds that in the long run, a one percentage point increase in the annual rate of appreciation of the real exchange rate would have a cumulative negative effect on real export growth of 1.8 percentage points. This result means that after four years, 20% yuan appreciation induces a $400 billion decrease in Chinese exports. Cheung, Chinn and Fujii (2010) , using data predating the Great Recession, find a smaller impact, but updated results in Cheung, Chinn and Qian (forthcoming) suggest a measurable response. In addition, it is likely that a Renminbi appreciation would likely induce a region-wide appreciation of 8 currencies against the dollar. That development would definitely facilitate the further dollar depreciation essential to American rebalancing.
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A second way to examine the issue of Chinese rebalancing is through the lens of saving and investment balances, which highlights the fact that the current account is related to the budget balance and the gap between private saving and investment. This perspective shifts the focus to the behavior of Chinese private saving (both household and corporate sector), as well as government saving. In contrast to the mid-2000's, when the surge in corporate saving was identified as a key factor, more recent analyses have focused on the elevated levels of all three components (Ma and Yi, 2010; Prasad, 2009 ).
Some of these trends are due to the trend decrease in the share of labor income in Chinese GDP. This phenomenon, combined with the relatively high household saving rate, means that merely trying to raise the household saving rate (by improving the social safety net, and by increasing access to consumer credit) cannot in and of itself solve the problem. Hence, rebalancing involves a rebalancing of the domestic shares of income, away from capital.
This point has become increasingly central as the debate has moved to whether wage rates are rising. Those familiar with the Lewis (1954) and Fei-Ranis (1964) model of development will recall that as wages rise, the share of income going to capital decreases. If the propensity to save of labor is less than that of capitalists, then the saving rate should decline (Kroeber, 2010) . It might be that this process is happening as a natural outcome arising from the exhaustion of labor close to the coastal provinces. Even if that is true, the process of raising household savings (in aggregate terms, not just as a share of household income) can be accelerated by aggressive government action, to reduce uncertainty by developing the health and social insurance networks, as suggested by Prasad (2009) .
In sum, there is scope for Chinese government policy to accelerate rebalancing. In the short term, this involves faster currency appreciation; 6 over the longer term, allowing state owned enterprises to pay dividends, reducing the monopoly power of the state owned corporations, and accelerating the development of a social safety net and provision of social services (which will reduce incentives for household saving, while decreasing government saving). Hence, while some aspects of East Asia's external imbalances will respond only to structural changes, more readily effected measures can have an immediate effect. Exchange rate movements can induce the textbook expenditure switching, as long as other countervailing policies are not implemented. This is an important factor, given the dire need for aggregate demand in the developed economies, in particular Europe.
Policy Challenges
Many of the recommendations that have been laid out have been raised numerous times before.
Is there any reason why these policies might be implemented more readily than before, especially against a backdrop of decelerating world growth? In fact, most commentary right now suggests that Chinese authorities will stop RMB appreciation in the face of slowing domestic growth, and the decline in the trade surplus. Clearly, slower appreciation will not enhance rebalancing. On the other hand, there are several reasons for hope.
The first reason is that there is an increasing recognition within China that the current development model is reaching an end-point. First, the slowing world economy makes continued reliance on exports as the engine of growth increasingly risky. Second, the high level of investment, allocated in the current fashion, is resulting in declining rates of return on capital.
Finally, the costs of building up massive stocks of low-yield foreign exchange reserves are becoming readily apparent to Chinese policymakers (e.g., Yu, 2011) . In the past, those policymakers have implemented changes slowly and deliberately. That caution has served the Chinese well; however, in the current macroeconomic and political environment, I believe speed is of the essence -so that a cautious approach to policy modification may ironically prove to be incautious.
11
Moving forward, I think the following key points need to be recalled.
First, we should not take the recent decline in the Chinese current account surplus as a sustainable trend. It is possible that it is due to stockpiling of commodities, or other temporary factors. Hence, we need to continue to press for greater appreciation of the RMB.
Second, the foregoing should not be taken to mean that Chinese revaluation would not alone eliminate the imbalances; rather it would facilitate East Asian adjustment more generally, by allowing other currencies to appreciate against the dollar. With relative prices
Third, adjustment will be even more imperative if Europe (and the US?) go into outright recession, despite the fact that political concerns will make policy implementation more difficult. 
